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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 Appellant Jeffrey Heffernan, a police officer in 
Paterson, New Jersey, was demoted after being observed 
obtaining a local mayoral candidate’s campaign sign at the 
request of his mother.  He brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against Appellees, including the City of Paterson, 
then-Mayor Jose Torres, Police Chief James Wittig, and 
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Police Administrator Michael Walker, for unconstitutional 
retaliation under the First Amendment.  Heffernan now 
appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees.  Because Heffernan has failed to come 
forward with evidence that he actually exercised his First 
Amendment rights, and because claims of retaliation based 
only on the perceived exercise of those rights are foreclosed 
by Fogarty v. Boles, 121 F.3d 886, 888 (3d Cir. 1997), we 
will affirm the District Court’s order. 
I.  
 Heffernan joined the Paterson Police Department in 
1985, and received various commendations for his police 
work over the next 20 years.  In late 2005, he was promoted 
to detective and assigned to an administrative detail in the 
office of the Chief of Police.  The events giving rise to this 
case occurred in April 2006, at a time when Lawrence 
Spagnola, a former Paterson police chief and close friend of 
Heffernan’s, was pursuing a bid to unseat the then-incumbent 
mayor, Jose Torres.  Heffernan, despite personally hoping 
that Spagnola would win the election, was unable to vote for 
Spagnola based on his city of residence, did not “work[] on” 
the campaign, (App. 2089), and did not consider himself 
“politically involved” with the campaign, (App. 486). 
 On April 13, 2006, Heffernan’s bedridden mother 
asked Heffernan to drive into downtown Paterson to pick up a 
large Spagnola campaign sign, to replace a smaller one that 
had been stolen from her lawn.  That same day, Heffernan 
contacted Spagnola’s campaign manager to arrange a time 
and place when he could pick up a lawn sign.  He then drove 
into Paterson, picked up the lawn sign from a distribution 
point at which Spagnola supporters and campaign staff were 
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present, and brought the sign to his mother’s house, where he 
left it for another family member to erect. 
 A Paterson police officer assigned to the security staff 
of Mayor Torres—Spagnola’s opponent—observed 
Heffernan’s brief encounter with the Spagnola campaign 
manager.  Word spread quickly, and the next day, one of 
Heffernan’s supervisors confronted him about his interaction 
with Spagnola’s campaign staff.  Heffernan protested that he 
“wasn’t politically involved[,]” and was “just picking up a 
sign for [his] mom.”  (App. 486–87.)  Nonetheless, Heffernan 
was immediately demoted to a “walking post” because of his 
“overt[] involvement in a political election.”  (App. 217.) 
 In August 2006, Heffernan filed this § 1983 action in 
the District of New Jersey, seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages based on Appellees’ alleged First 
Amendment violations.  Although the precise nature of the 
claims articulated in Heffernan’s complaint was the source of 
lengthy debate before the District Court, neither party appeals 
from that Court’s most recent conclusion that the complaint 
states claims for (1) retaliatory demotion based on 
Heffernan’s exercise of the right to freedom of speech, and 
(2) retaliatory demotion based on his exercise of the right to 
freedom of association. 
 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
Judge Sheridan, who was originally assigned to this matter, 
denied both motions without permitting the filing of briefs in 
opposition.  For reasons that are not entirely clear, Heffernan 
proceeded to trial on only his free-association claim, which 
resulted in a jury verdict of $105,000 in his favor.  After trial, 
however, Judge Sheridan retroactively recused himself based 
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on what he concluded was a conflict of interest and vacated 
the jury’s verdict.   
 The case was reassigned to Judge Cavanaugh, who 
revisited the parties’ motions for summary judgment but, like 
Judge Sheridan, did not allow briefing beyond the original 
filings.  He then granted summary judgment for Appellees on 
the free-expression claim, but entirely failed to address the 
free-association claim—i.e., the claim on which the jury had 
returned a verdict in Heffernan’s favor.  On appeal, a panel of 
this Court concluded that the District Court had erred by 
granting summary judgment without permitting the parties to 
file briefs in opposition, and by failing to consider the 
viability of Heffernan’s free-association claim.  492 F. App’x 
225 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 On remand, the case was reassigned yet again, this 
time to Judge McNulty, who permitted a full round of fresh 
briefing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  
In an opinion filed on March 5, 2014, Judge McNulty 
concluded that Heffernan had adequately pleaded and 
prosecuted his free-association claim.  He nonetheless found 
that Heffernan had failed to produce evidence that he actually 
exercised his First Amendment rights, and in the alternative, 
Heffernan was foreclosed from seeking compensation under § 
1983 for retaliation based only on the perceived exercise of 
those rights.  Accordingly, Judge McNulty granted summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees on all counts.  Heffernan filed 
a timely notice of appeal. 
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment is plenary.  Trinity Indus., 
Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant 
establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We view the evidence “‘in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’”  Trinity Indus., 
Inc., 735 F.3d at 134–35 (quoting Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton 
Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
III.  
 The First Amendment generally prohibits a public 
employer from disciplining, demoting, or firing an employee 
based on that employee’s exercise of First Amendment rights, 
including speaking out on a matter of public concern or 
engaging in expressive conduct to the same effect, see 
Fogarty, 121 F.3d at 888, or associating with a particular 
political party, see Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike, 293 F.3d 655, 
663–64 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Rutan v. Rep. Party of Ill., 497 
U.S. 62, 75 (1990)).1  This appeal raises three issues: (1) 
whether the District Court erred by considering Appellees’ 
motion for summary judgment on Heffernan’s free-
association claim; (2) whether the record contains evidence 
upon which a jury could find that Heffernan actually 
                                              
1 The primary exceptions, not relevant here, are where 
the government’s concern “with the effective and efficient 
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public” outweighs the 
employee’s free-speech rights, Fogarty, 121 F.3d at 888, or 
where “party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
position involved,” Goodman, 293 F.3d at 663. 
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exercised his free-speech or free-association rights when he 
picked up a political sign as a favor for his mother; and (3) 
whether Heffernan nonetheless may obtain relief for the 
violation of a constitutional right under § 1983 even where he 
did not exercise any First Amendment right, but his employer 
mistakenly believed he did. 
A.  
 Heffernan first argues that the District Court should 
not have considered Appellees’ motion for summary 
judgment on his free-association claim, and should instead 
have allowed that claim to proceed to trial without further 
scrutiny.  In support of this unusual proposition, he notes that 
a jury already returned a verdict—albeit one vacated on 
procedural grounds—in his favor.  Therefore, according to 
Heffernan, the free-association claim must have had sufficient 
factual support to permit that verdict. 
 Heffernan believes we acknowledged as much in our 
previous opinion in this case.  There, we ordered that on 
remand, the District Court, along with deciding whether 
Heffernan had adequately “pleaded and prosecuted” his free-
association claim, “should also consider the appropriate 
remedy, whether it be dismissal of the Free Association 
claim, reopening discovery solely on Free Association, or 
proceeding to trial.”  492 F. App’x at 230.  The lack of a 
reference to summary judgment, in Heffernan’s view, bolsters 
his argument that the District Court erred by considering 
Appellees’ motion as to the free-association claim. 
 This is a misreading of our opinion.  On the previous 
appeal, it was apparent that the District Court had made two 
reversible errors.  First, the Court granted summary judgment 
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for Appellees on Heffernan’s free-speech claim without 
permitting Heffernan to file a brief in opposition; second, the 
Court’s opinion made no reference whatsoever to Heffernan’s 
still-pending free-association claim.  As a result, we ordered 
the District Court “to permit the parties to re-file their 
summary judgment motions with updated statements of 
undisputed material fact and to allow opposition and reply 
briefing.”  Id. at 229.  The portion of the opinion on which 
Heffernan relies simply directed the District Court to consider 
Appellees’ argument that Heffernan had not adequately 
pleaded or prosecuted his free-association claim—which to 
that point had been overlooked in the case’s complicated 
procedural history.  In sum, our disposition of that appeal had 
no bearing on Appellees’ right to contest the sufficiency of 
Heffernan’s evidence on his free-association claim through a 
motion under Rule 56 for summary judgment.   
 Moreover, Appellees filed a timely motion under Rule 
56 even before the first trial in this case.  They did not receive 
the benefit of a procedurally sound ruling on that motion until 
it was considered by the District Court in the opinion that is 
the subject of this appeal.  We thus reject Heffernan’s 
argument that the District Court improperly considered the 
merits of Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on his 
free-association claim. 
B.  
 We next address whether the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment on Heffernan’s free-speech and 
free-association claims insofar as they are predicated on the 
allegation that he suffered retaliation for actually engaging in 
speech or conduct protected under the First Amendment.  
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 First, with respect to his free-speech claim, Heffernan 
must establish that: “(1) [he] spoke on a matter of public 
concern; (2) [his] interest in that field outweighs the 
government’s concern with the effective and efficient 
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public; (3) the speech 
caused the retaliation; and (4) the adverse employment 
decision would not have occurred but for the speech.”  
Fogarty, 121 F.3d at 888 (citing Green v. Phila. Housing 
Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Here, the only 
element in dispute is the first—i.e., whether a jury could find 
that Heffernan actually spoke on a matter of public concern.  
We note that Heffernan need not prove he communicated a 
message verbally—and indeed, the record is devoid of such 
evidence—because expressive conduct also is protected under 
the First Amendment.  Such conduct exists where “an intent 
to convey a particularized message was present, and the 
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it.”  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 
(1989).  “[T]his is a fact-sensitive, context-dependent inquiry, 
and . . . the putative speaker bears the burden of proving that 
his or her conduct is expressive.”  Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 Heffernan’s best argument here is that his actions had 
the effect of assisting Spagnola’s campaign, and indeed, 
Torres’s supporters construed his conduct as an expression of 
direct personal support for the campaign.  But, as recognized 
by the District Court, this is only half the picture.  Heffernan 
repeatedly disavowed anything resembling “an intent to 
convey a particularized message.”  For instance, at 
deposition, he denied “working on” Spagnola’s campaign, 
(App. 2089), being “politically involved” with the campaign, 
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(App. 486), or even “supporting [Spagnola] for mayor” at all, 
(App. 191).  Instead, in his own description of the incident to 
a friend, “I was picking up a sign for my mother, and that’s 
all I was doing.”  (App. 483.)  In light of this unambiguous 
testimony, no room exists for a jury to find that Heffernan 
intended to convey a political message when he picked up the 
sign at issue.  The District Court thus properly granted 
summary judgment on Heffernan’s claim of retaliation based 
on the actual exercise of his free-speech rights. 
 Nor does Heffernan fare better on his free-association 
claim, which requires proof “(1) that the employee works for 
a public agency in a position that does not require a political 
affiliation, (2) that the employee maintained an affiliation 
with a political party, and (3) that the employee’s political 
affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
adverse employment decision.”  Goodman, 293 F.3d at 663–
64 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  The first and 
third elements are plainly established on the record before us.  
With respect to the second element, Heffernan maintains that 
his close friendship with Spagnola, his passive desire to see 
Spagnola win the election, and the belief of Spagnola’s 
campaign manager that Heffernan was a “supporter” of the 
campaign, (App. 391), taken together, are sufficient to prove 
that he “maintained an association” with the Spagnola 
campaign. 
 For the same reasons described above, however, we 
conclude that Heffernan has failed to raise a genuine dispute 
of material fact on this point.  Heffernan himself confirmed 
that regardless of what others may have perceived, he did not 
have any affiliation with the campaign other than the cursory 
contact necessary for him to pick up the sign for his mother.  
Consequently, the record is insufficient to allow a jury to 
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return a verdict in Heffernan’s favor on his claim of 
retaliation based on the actual exercise of his right to freedom 
of association.  We will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment with respect to Heffernan’s claim of 
retaliation based on the actual exercise of his free-association 
rights. 
C.  
 In the alternative, Heffernan argues that he is entitled 
to proceed to trial on both claims under a “perceived-support” 
theory, i.e., where the employer’s retaliation is traceable to a 
genuine but incorrect or unfounded belief that the employee 
exercised a First Amendment right.  In other words, 
Heffernan asks us to eliminate a traditional element of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim—namely, the requirement that 
the plaintiff in fact exercised a First Amendment right. 
 That argument is squarely foreclosed by our own 
binding precedent, which holds that a free-speech retaliation 
claim is actionable under § 1983 only where the adverse 
action at issue was prompted by an employee’s actual, rather 
than perceived, exercise of constitutional rights.  See Ambrose 
v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Fogarty, 121 F.3d at 891.  All of our sister circuits to consider 
this issue in the context of a free-speech claim have reached 
the same conclusion.  See Wasson v. Sonoma Cnty. Junior 
Coll., 203 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2000); Jones v. Collins, 132 
F.3d 1048, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998); Barkoo v. Melby, 901 F.2d 
613, 619 (7th Cir. 1990).  Because Heffernan provides no 
convincing reason to distinguish these cases, the District 
Court correctly denied Heffernan’s alternative basis for relief 
with respect to his free-speech claim. 
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 Heffernan’s last contention is that Ambrose and 
Fogarty, each of which addressed free-speech claims, leave 
room for us to conclude that he may seek relief under § 1983 
on a perceived free-association claim.  By way of example, 
he directs us to Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 
286 (6th Cir. 2012), in which the Sixth Circuit addressed the 
employee-plaintiffs’ claim of workplace retaliation based on 
their supposed affiliation with the Republican Party.  There, 
the panel concluded that the employer’s mere assumption of 
an affiliation, whether founded or not, was sufficient for the 
plaintiffs’ claim to proceed.  Id. at 299–300. 
  To begin with, we have no reason to believe that the 
holding of Dye can be reconciled with Ambrose and 
Fogarty—and nor did the Sixth Circuit.  See id. at 300 (“[W]e 
find the Third Circuit’s conclusion [in Ambrose] 
unpersuasive.”).  But beyond that, we are not convinced that 
Dye provides any reason to depart from our established 
holding on this point.  Most notably, the Dye panel suggested 
it was “adopt[ing] the reasoning” of the First and Tenth 
Circuits in Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 939 (1st Cir. 
2008), and Gann v. Cline, 519 F.3d 1090, 1094 (10th Cir. 
2008), both of which involved adverse employment actions 
taken against employees who did not adopt a position on a 
local political issue.  Dye, 702 F.3d at 300.  Like the District 
Court, however, we read Welch and Gann as natural 
applications of the settled First Amendment principle that an 
employer may not discipline an employee based on the 
decision to remain politically neutral or silent.  See Galli v. 
N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 272–73 (3d Cir. 
2007).  And indeed, the emphasis on that point in Welch and 
Gann is, if anything, consistent with the admonition in 
Ambrose and Fogarty that a First Amendment retaliation 
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claim under § 1983 must rest upon the actual exercise of a 
particular constitutional right—whether it be the right to 
speak on a political issue, to associate with a particular party, 
or to not speak or associate with respect to political matters at 
all. 
 Heffernan, however, has not presented evidence that 
he was retaliated against for taking a stand of calculated 
neutrality.  Instead, he argues that Appellees demoted him on 
a factually incorrect basis.  But it is not “a violation of the 
Constitution for a government employer to [discipline] an 
employee based upon substantively incorrect information,” 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679 (1994), even where 
the government employer erroneously believes that the 
employee had engaged in protected activity under the First 
Amendment.  To paraphrase our colleague, Judge Roth, “a 
[First Amendment] claim depends on [First Amendment 
protected conduct], and there was none in this case.”  Pro v. 
Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1996) (Roth, J., 
dissenting).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment with respect to Heffernan’s 
claims insofar as they are based on a “perceived-support” 
theory of recovery.  
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order of March 5, 2014 granting summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees. 
